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The purpose of this paper is to present a strategy for applying discourse analysis to the debate 
concerning the legal status of Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”).  In the 1990s activists 
concerned with corporate involvement in activities that harm workers and the environment 
encouraged corporations to adopt voluntary initiatives, which have come to be known as CSR 
policies or corporate codes of conduct.  Roughly ten years later NGOs like Christian Aid, which at 
first was a strong proponent of voluntary corporate codes of conduct, have begun calling for a 
greater emphasis on law and accountability mechanisms.1  Trade unions especially have expressed 
deep scepticism of the idea of CSR initiatives and the attendant industry that has grown up around 
them.2  The trade union movement criticises CSR initiatives for being a strategy to avoid regulation 
and trade unions.3   
The debate appears to involve the opposition of a business oriented discourse, which I will 
call the CSR discourse, and a legal discourse that incorporates elements from international 
environmental and human rights law.  At the centre of the debate is the question of how to ensure 
the protection of the environment and human rights from the activities of corporations that operate 
across national boundaries.  This question arises because of assumptions we make about the nature 
of the corporation and the nature of national and international law.   
                                                 
1 See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press 2006) at 195.   
2 Id. at 196.   See text accompanying notes 26 and 27 below regarding the CSR industry. 
3 Id. at 196-7. 
 1
Given the collision of CSR and international legal discourse, discourse analysis based on the 
ideas of Michel Foucault presents itself as a potentially fruitful way of unpacking the assumptions 
that contribute to this ongoing debate.  Foucault and other postmodern philosophers developed the 
idea that all knowledge consists of subjective interpretations of the world around us that are 
conditioned by our social surroundings and the dominant discourse of the time.4  From a 
postmodern perspective, the debate about the nature of CSR can be seen as a confrontation between 
competing discourses that reflect different subjective interpretations of the nature and activities of 
corporations and their effects on human beings and the physical environment.   
In the following paper I hope to present a strategy for applying discourse analysis to this 
debate drawing on the ideas of Michel Foucault and the English linguist Norman Fairclough.  I first 
present my understanding of discourse and the elements of Foucault’s and Fairclough’s theories that 
I believe can be usefully applied to this project in section 2.  In section 3 I show how I would 
approach the analysis of the discourses that appear in the debate about the nature of CSR.  I 
conclude the paper in section 4 with my thoughts on what this discourse analysis CSR can 
contribute to our understanding of the corporate social responsibility movement and the debates 
surrounding it. 
 
2.  Discourse analysis based on Foucault and Fairclough 
In linguistics “discourses” are linguistic units composed of several sentences, such as 
conversations, arguments or speeches.  In the social sciences “discourse” has acquired another 
meaning that has its roots in the work of Michel Foucault.  Foucault understood discourse “as 
                                                 
4 Postmodernism is the term used to describe the break from previous periods of intellectual history (Renaissance, 
Enlightenment, and Modernism) that consisted in rejecting the view that it is possible to construct a true and meaningful 
interpretation of the world.  Postmodern theories are based on the view that the world is inherently fragmented and 
heterogeneous, and that all meaning and knowledge is merely subjective interpretation conditioned by social 
surroundings and the dominant discourse of the time.  
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consisting of a set of strategies which are part of social practices.”5  Foucault focused his analysis 
of discourse on what makes speech acts meaningful.6  He was not interested in interpreting texts or 
determining the meaning of texts, but rather in the conditions necessary for the existence of 
meaning.  In Foucault’s view meaning is created through relations of power in society.  A discourse 
develops in the context of power relations, which serve to define the realm of meaningful speech 
acts about a specific topic. 
Especially social science scholars working in linguistics, anthropology, sociology, cognitive 
psychology, social psychology and communication studies began to use discourse analysis more or 
less at the same time and in relation with other new disciplines, such as semiotics, 
psycholinguistics, and sociolinguistics.  Social scientists working with discourse analysis appear to 
agree that qualitative social research, which would include discourse analysis, “needs concepts and 
criteria to assess the quality of its findings, but that the classical concepts of validity and reliability 
used in quantitative research cannot be applied without modification.”7  Here the agreement appears 
to end, as social scientists working from different theoretical positions inevitably disagree about the 
validity of each others’ assumptions and the methodologies derived from them.8
Social scientists’ preoccupation with linguistics, methodological issues and the criteria for 
assessing the quality of their findings can be viewed as a departure from the basic idea of discourse 
analysis developed by Foucault and other postmodern philosophers.  These philosophers were not 
so concerned with developing a particular method of analysing discourse as they were focused on 
questioning the basic assumptions of quantitative and qualitative research methods.  Michel 
                                                 
5 Michel Foucault, Power:  Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, vol 3, edited by James D. Faubion, (London, 
Penguin Books, 2002). 
6 Foucault presented his theory of discourse in The Archaeology of Meaning.  The following is a very general summary 
of his approach to analyzing discourse. 
7 Michael Meyer, “Between theory, method, and politics:  positioning of the approaches to CDA” in Ruth Wodak and 
Michael Meyer, editors, Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (London, SAGE publications, 2001) (hereinafter 
referred to as “Wodak and Meyer”) pages 14-31, at 29. 
8 See, e.g., id., at 16-17 (describing the debates between Norman Fairclough, who is a proponent of “critical discourse 
analysis”, which has a very specific meaning within a certain network of European social scientists, and proponents of 
other approaches to discourse analysis).   
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Foucault in particular was not interested in the linguistic features of texts, but rather in the way our 
“knowledge” of the world is socially constructed through “a discourse understood as consisting of a 
set of strategies which are part of social practices.”9  From this perspective, social scientists’ 
concerns with methodology and validity are themselves conditioned by and inscribed within a given 
discourse, and is conditioned by the power relations existing within the social practices of the 
various disciplines of the social sciences.   
In order to explore the possibilities for applying discourse analysis to the CSR debate, I will 
adopt the postmodern theoretical position that meaning is created through interpretations of our 
perceptions of the world that are conditioned by our social surroundings and the dominant 
discourse(s) of our time.   While the purpose of discourse analysis from Foucault’s point of view is 
not to provide definite answers or provide a specific methodology that assures the validity of one’s 
conclusions but rather to alert us to unacknowledged relations of power that determine how we 
understand the world, he did not eschew all considerations of methodology nor do I.  In order for 
my deconstructive reading and interpretation of the CSR debate to have any meaning, I must 
explain what I mean by discourse, how I identify the discourses I want to analyse and what the 
analysis actually consists of. 
I rely heavily on Norman Fairclough’s approach to discourse analysis for the construction of 
my methodology.  Norman Fairclough’s identifies himself as belonging to a network of social 
scientists that use critical discourse analysis (CDA) in their work.  These scholars do not see CDA 
as constituting “a well-defined empirical method but rather a cluster of approaches with a similar 
theoretical base and similar research questions.”10  Fairclough’s approach to discourse analysis is 
inspired by Foucault’s although he acknowledges that he departs slightly from this tradition by 
focusing his attention on the linguistic features of texts.  As indicated above, I believe that 
                                                 
9 Foucault, supra note 5, at 2-4.   
10Meyer, supra note 7, at 23. 
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Fairclough’s attention to the linguistic features of texts is inconsistent with Foucault’s approach to 
discourse analysis.  Indeed, I believe focusing on linguistic features of texts can complicate the 
analysis by importing linguistic assumptions that can push the analysis in a predetermined direction.  
Accordingly, I disregard those aspects of Fairclough’s approach that require analysis of linguistic 
features of texts.  On the other hand, Fairclough’s understanding of discourse appears to be 
substantially consistent with Foucault’s views and I believe it is helpful to present Fairclough’s 
views here as part of my construction of a method of discourse analysis.    
Fairclough’s approach to discourse analysis proceeds from the view that semiosis, i.e. all 
forms of meaning making, including visual images, body language, as well as language, is an 
irreducible part of social processes.11  According to Fairclough, all practices are practices of 
production. That is, they are the arenas within which all aspects of social life—economic, political, 
cultural or everyday life—are produced.12   Fairclough sees social life as consisting of 
interconnected networks of social practices. Every social practice includes a number of elements, 
which are dialectically related:  productive activity, means of production, social relations, social 
identities, cultural values, consciousness, and semiosis.13  Fairclough sees semiosis as figuring 
broadly in three ways in social practices14:   
1. It figures as a part of the social activity within a practice.  Doing a job is a social practice, 
and using language in a particular way is part of that social practice. 
2.  Semiosis figures in the representations produced by social actors of their own and other 
social practices.  Representations enter and shape social processes and practices.   
3.  Semiosis also figures in the “performances” of particular positions within social practices.  
That is, people who differ in social class, in gender, in nationality, in ethnic or cultural membership, 
                                                 
11 Norman Fairclough, “CDA as a Method in Social Scientific Research” in Wodak and Meyer, 121-138, at 122.   
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 123. 
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and in life experience, produce different “performances” of a particular position within social 
practices.   
Fairclough’s conception of a discourse is based on his view of the role of semiosis in social 
practices.  He says, “Semiosis in the representation and self-representation of social practices 
constitutes discourses.  Discourses are diverse representations of social life which are inherently 
positioned—differently positioned social actors ‘see’ and represent social life in different ways, 
different discourses.”15  
Fairclough then builds upon his theory of the role of semiosis in social practice to arrive at the 
concept of dominant discourse.  First, he explains, “Social practices networked in a particular way 
constitute a social order,…for instance the social order of education in a particular society at a 
particular time.”16  The semiotic aspect of a social order is what Fairclough calls an order of 
discourse.  An order of discourse is a social structuring of different ways of making meaning within 
the social order.17  “One aspect of this structuring is dominance:  some ways of making meaning are 
dominant or mainstream in a particular order of discourse; others are marginal, or oppositional, or 
‘alternative’.”18   
Based on the foregoing theoretical considerations, Fairclough proposes the following analytic 
framework to follow in analysing discourse19: 
Step 1:  Identification of a social problem which has a semiotic aspect.  Here Fairclough 
argues that CDA is a social science that has “emancipatory objectives, and is focused upon the 
problems confronting what we can loosely refer to as the ‘losers’ within particular forms of social 
life—the poor, the socially excluded, those subject to oppressive gender or race relations, and so 
                                                 
15 Id., at 123.   
16 Id., at 124. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id., at 125.  Fairclough acknowledges that this framework is modelled upon the critical theorist Roy Bhaskar’s 
concept of “explanatory critique”, in R. Bhaskar (1986) Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, London:  Verso.  
The following summary of the analytical framework promoted by Fairclough is based on his presentation at pages 125-
7.   
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forth.”  I submit that it is not necessary to focus on problems confronting the “losers” in order to use 
CDA.  It is enough to identify a social problem which has a semiotic aspect.  I will return to this 
argument in the next section of this paper. 
Step 2:  This part of the analysis is directed toward determining the causes of the social 
problem.  The basic question underlying this stage is, in Fairclough’s words, “what is it about the 
way in which social life is structured and organized that makes this a problem which is resistant to 
easy resolution?”  Here the analysis must take account of the way social practices are networked 
together, the way semiosis relates to other elements of social practices and the features of discourse 
itself.  At this stage of the analysis Fairclough feels it necessary to incorporate both linguistic and 
social analysis.  
Step 3:  At this point the analysis turns toward considering whether the social order generates 
the problem in order to sustain itself, i.e. whether the problem contributes to sustaining the order of 
discourse, which itself sustains particular relations of power and domination which characterise the 
social order under consideration. 
There are two more steps in Fairclough’s analytic framework.  They are a positive critique, 
the aim of which is to identify unrealized possibilities for change within the way things are, and a 
reflexive analysis of the discourse analysis which seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of the analysis 
as a critique. These two stages reflect Fairclough’s commitment to a Leftist political agenda.  I do 
not consider these steps as being crucial to my analysis of the CSR-debate. 
 
3. Application of the Foucault/Fairclough-inspired analytical framework in a discourse 
analysis of the CSR-debate 
In this section I hope to show how the Foucault/Fairclough-inspired analytical framework 
developed above could be used to direct a discourse analysis of the CSR-debate.  Rather than 
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choosing specific texts, I refer to the discourses of CSR, international human rights, and traditional 
international law.  A more thorough discourse analysis would trace the development of CSR and 
critical responses to it through media reports and articles in business and law journals.  I have also 
left out any explicit analysis of the different elements of social practice their dialectical relationship 
with semiosis.  The following is therefore merely an indication of possible avenues for further 
investigation. 
Step 1:  Identification of a problem with a semiotic aspect.  Newspaper coverage of the 
development of CSR generally locate the origins of the current CSR movement to the problems 
Nike had in the 1990s when its use of sweatshops in Asia for production of its shoes attracted the 
attention of various NGOs and aroused the indignation of a broad range of society.  For example, in 
the Financial Times on Jan. 27 2005 contained a commentary that included the following statement:  
“Since Nike got into trouble for allowing the exploitation of workers in Asian factories, corporate 
social responsibility has become all the rage.”20  Others have noted that the impetus toward CSR 
started with the disclosure of transnational corporations’ (TNCs) involvement (with the U.S. 
government) in the overthrow of Chile’s Marxist government in the early 1970s and a series of 
other highly publicized misadventures by TNCs involving corruption and interference in local 
politics.21  These accounts of the origins of CSR indicate that CSR is a response to the view that 
TNCs participate, if not instigate, human rights abuses.  The debate about whether corporations 
should be encouraged to adopt voluntary initiatives or be held accountable under binding legal 
norms is a debate about what is the best way to get TNCs to stop this kind of activity.  The semiotic 
aspect of the problem is seen in the debate—which is a straightforward example of semiosis as it 
                                                 
20 John Gapper, “The pint of taking responsibility”, Financial Times, London, Jan 27, 2005, page 19. 
21 Larry Catá Backer, “Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law:  The United Nations’ Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law”, 
37 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 287, 313. (2006). 
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involves the production of texts—about whether CSR actually being used by corporations to avoid 
binding obligations to negotiate with trade unions and respect human rights.   
Step 2:  The causes of the problem, i.e. what is it about the way in which social life is 
structured and organized that makes this a problem which is resistant to easy resolution?  The CSR 
debate can be understood as a conflict between different legal paradigms, which organise the way in 
which we think about human rights and transnational corporations.   
The basic idea underlying the CSR movement is that a corporation’s responsibility extends 
beyond the objective of providing financial returns to its shareholders.  This view is at odds with an 
older view of the nature of a corporation.  Since the mid-20th century the dominant view of the 
primary purpose of corporations was that it existed to serve the holders of capital interests in the 
enterprise by maximizing the value of the capital amalgamated in the corporation.22     
On the other hand, the idea that corporations should adopt voluntary CSR initiatives is fully 
consistent with the dominant view of the corporation.  Corporations are created by laws that 
regulate how they are created and various regulations establish their legal obligations to 
shareholders.  Laws governing corporations generally assume that the ultimate object of corporate 
existence is maximizing shareholder wealth, as evidenced by rules allowing corporations to 
distribute corporate property for charitable purposes within certain clearly defined limits.23  In 
general the state can be seen as defining the parameters within which the corporation can itself 
determine how to maximise shareholder value, while the market is to provide the mechanism for 
regulating most corporate activity.24
                                                 
22 See id., at pages 298-300.  One could argue that this view of the purpose of the corporation is primarily Anglo-
American.  In Europe stakeholder, as opposed to shareholder, interests have enjoyed greater recognition.  See John M. 
Conley, Cynthia A. Williams, “Engage, Embed, and Embellish:  Theory versus Practice in the Corporate Social 
Responsibility Movement”, 31 Journal of Corporation Law 1, at page 2. (2005).  The extent to which the Anglo-
American view of the corporation influences the CSR debate in Europe and other parts of the world should be 
considered in a complete analysis of the CSR debate.  
23 See Backer, note 21 above, at 296-7. 
24 Id., at 298. 
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Evidence that CSR does not appear to pose pose much of a challenge for the dominant 
corporate discourse is the growth of CSR activities since the 1990s.  Between 1999 and 2002, the 
percentage of Fortune Global Top 250 companies that produced a separate social, environmental, or 
sustainability report in addition to their required financial reports increased from 35 to 45.25  In 
1993 only 10% of the Global 500 produced such reports.26   Many of the same companies that 
produce social and environmental reports have also changed the way they interact with 
environmental, labour, human rights and other NGOs.  Instead of purely adversarial relationships, 
in which the corporation defends its interests against issue-advocacy NGOs, many of these 
companies enlist NGOS to help them identify issues, produce and audit reports, and to conduct 
“dialogues” with diverse “stakeholders” around the world.27  
In addition to the changed reporting and public relations practices of corporations, the 
expansion of CSR-thinking is seen in a new class of CSR professionals.  These are professionals 
who occupy themselves solely or primarily with CSR issues.  They include professionals employed 
within for-profit companies, outsiders who consult with companies and audit their non-financial 
reports, executives at pension funds, insurance companies and other institutional investment 
organizations who believe in socially responsible investing, those who work for and on behalf of 
NGOs, and a new class of academics at business and professional schools whose central research 
interest is CSR.  
The call for CSR initiatives can be understood as deriving from the discourse of human rights, 
which is based on a legal paradigm of individual rights.  NGOs calling for CSR initiatives in the 
1990s invoked the international legal discourse of human rights, which began to achieve 
prominence, if not dominance, with the UN General Assembly’s adoption of the Universal 
                                                 
25 See Conley and Williams, note 22 above, at page 4-5, citing KPMG Int’l, International Survey of Corporate 
Sustainability Reporting 2002 9 (2002). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 5. 
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Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which emphasizes the rights of individuals rather than who 
has the duty to respect those rights.28  Indeed, the well-known international law scholar Lou Henkin 
argues on this basis that the Universal Declaration addresses multinationals among other organs of 
society:   
 The Universal Declaration is not addressed only to governments.  It is a ‘common standard for all 
peoples and all nations.’  It means that ‘every individual and every organ of society shall strive—by 
progressive measures…to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance among the 
people of the member states.’ Every individual includes juridical persons. Every individual and every 
organ of society excludes no one, no company, no market, no cyberspace.  The Universal Declaration 
applies to them all.29
 
Voluntary CSR initiatives are at odds with this view of human rights.  Limiting corporate 
social responsibility to voluntary initiatives suggests that they have no legal obligation to respect 
human rights—that it is an option corporations may choose if they are persuaded by business and 
moral arguments.    
The human rights discourse described above is also at odds with the dominant state-centred 
view of international law.  This view of international law asserts that states are the main actors in 
the international system and the only bearers of human rights obligations under international law.  
According to this approach, human rights problems are viewed through the lens of state 
responsibility, which demands that human rights problems concerning non-state actors, such as 
corporations, be dealt with as questions of the state’s obligation to ensure respect for human 
rights.30  Human rights law is nothing more than a requirement that governments protect everyone 
from those who might undermine those rights.  Human rights are made completely consistent with 
the traditional view of international law through the device of state responsibility. 
Step 3:  whether the problem contributes to sustaining the order of discourse.    Based on the 
foregoing descriptions of CSR, human rights, and international law discourses, CSR and 
                                                 
28 For discussion of the significance of the Universal Declaration’s focus on individual rights, see Clapham, supra note 
1, at 227-8. 
29 L. Henkin, ”The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets’ 25 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law (1999) 24-25 (emphasis in the original).  
30 See Clapham, note 1 above, at 25. 
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international law discourses may be understood as belonging to a dominant discourse that places the 
state at the centre of efforts to protect individual rights and corporations squarely in the private 
sector, which by definition does not have any legal obligations to respect individual rights other 
than those imposed by the governments that have jurisdiction over the corporations.  The 
“accountability” position of NGOs may be seen as drawing on an alternative human rights discourse 
that sees corporations and other non-state actors as bearers of human rights obligations.  
Alternatively, it may also be understood as standing squarely in the dominant international legal 
discourse of state responsibility when it calls for binding legal rules.  While Lou Henkin and others 
have begun arguing that corporations and other non-state actors are bearers of human rights 
obligations, it is overshadowed by the CSR movement’s emphasis on voluntary initiatives and the 
dominant legal discourse of state responsibility.  To the extent the debate is framed in terms of 
voluntary initiatives versus States’ adoption of binding and directly enforceable legal obligations, 
the debate actually seems to reinforce the existing discourse of state responsibility to protect human 
rights.  Other ways of protecting individuals’ human rights are being developed,31 but they are 
overshadowed by the current responsibility vs. accountability debate. 
4. Conclusions 
The foregoing sketch of a discourse analysis of the CSR debate indicates that participants in 
the debate invoke a number of legal discourses to frame and inform the debate.  A complete 
analysis would have to look more closely at the paths of development followed by each legal 
discourse and take into account more social practices than what is evident from legal texts and 
literature.  The human rights discourse itself has a long history that includes not just legal discourse 
but also moral and political philosophy.  The dominant international legal discourse also has a long 
history and its emergence as the dominant discourse is in itself a complex subject.  Discourse 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., Clapham, note 1 above. 
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analysis may be helpful in arriving at a more sophisticated understanding of the interests involved 
in the various positions taken in the CSR debate.  Whether a more sophisticated understanding of 
the debate will lead to any change depends on the persuasiveness of the analysis and all the social 
factors that determine how scholarship eventually becomes incorporated into social life. 
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